Accident: Turnagain

Warm-Up Bowl, Seattle Ridge – Accident Report
Kenai Mountains, Alaska

Location: Warm-Up Bowl, Seattle Ridge, Turnagain Pass – Kenai Mountains
Lat/Lon: N 60.815216 W 149.218522
Date: March 22, 2025, Time: ~14:30
Report by: Chugach National Forest Avalanche Center (CNFAC)
Contact: staff@chugachavalanche.org, website: ChugachAvalanche.org

Synopsis:
One snowmachiner triggered an avalanche, was caught, fully buried, and did not survive.

Avalanche Summary:
A snowmachiner riding on the lower portion of a large bowl triggered an avalanche that propagated upslope. The avalanche released on a layer of buried surface hoar between 2 to 3’ deep and approximately 500’ wide. The rider tried to ride off the side of the debris but was swept into a terrain trap and buried near their snowmachine roughly 12’ deep. Despite a large rescue effort from many riders converging on the area, the rider did not survive.

Avalanche Information
Type: Hard Slab
Problem/Character: Persistent Slab
Crown Depth: 30”
Width: 500’
Vertical Run: 500’
Trigger: Snowmachiner
Weak Layer: Buried Surface Hoar
Aspect: Northeast (50 deg.)
Elevation: 3150’ at crown
Slope Angle: 35-40 degrees
Slope Characteristics: Alpine bowl, below steep convex rocky ridge, abrupt transition to low angle terrain in runout zone, alpine tundra and talus slopes. Two significant moraine features create terrain traps in the runout zone.
Code: HS-AMu-R3-D3-O

Backcountry Avalanche Forecast
The avalanche danger was rated Considerable in the alpine and treeline elevations and Moderate below treeline on the day of the accident. Due to an exceptionally well-developed and widespread layer of buried surface hoar in the region, the avalanche danger had been rated Considerable or higher for more than three weeks prior to this accident. The Bottom Line of the avalanche forecast stated: “There were 4 human-triggered avalanches yesterday 2 to 3’ deep most likely failing on a layer of buried surface hoar. Trying to outsmart this problem may have severe consequences. If you want to avoid the likelihood of being caught in an avalanche the safest option is to stick to low angle terrain away from steep overhead slopes.”

(https://www.cnfaic.org/forecast/#/forecast/turnagain/164854)

Weather Summary
From late January through mid-February, a cold, clear, dry spell throughout southcentral Alaska led to widespread surface hoar growth and near surface faceting. Field observations of exceptionally dense and large grain surface hoar (10 to 30 mm grain sizes) were reported throughout the region. During that dry spell, uncharacteristically light winds relative to typical high pressure weather patterns in the region allowed the weak layer to remain largely undisturbed on the surface except on ridgelines and some exposed high elevation terrain. A small pulse of precipitation on February 14 to 15 buried the weak layer with 2 to 3” of new snow* (0.2” snow water equivalent, or SWE). Minimal snowfall for the next 10 days (1.0” SWE, ~10” snow) led to the layer being preserved but only showing signs of being a problematic weak layer in areas that are typically favored with heavier snowfall, like Seattle Ridge and bowls in the Seattle Creek drainage.

Steady incremental loading continued in late February with a storm bringing 1” of SWE (~10” snow) from February 26 to 28. Human-triggered avalanche activity was widespread on the north end of Seattle Ridge during this storm period, with no known burials. From March 3 to 6, another storm brought 1” SWE (~10” snow) and another round of human-triggered avalanches in the area. This included several large avalanches on Seattle Ridge and Lynx Creek. Gradual loading from March 8 to 22 brought the total snowpack load on top of the weak layer at the time of the accident to approximately 4.9” SWE and weak layer depth to between 2 and 3’. On the day of the accident, there was no snowfall and light winds averaging 10 to 15 mph out of the east with broken cloud cover and temperatures in the mid-20s to mid-30s F.

* All snowfall and snow water equivalent measurements are from the NCRS Center Ridge SNOTEL site located 2.6 miles SSE of the accident site.

Snowpack
CNFAC forecasters visited the site the day after the accident to collect detailed information on the avalanche. While they were unable to access the crown due to safety concerns, they were able to dig a snowpit near the left flank of the avalanche. They had previously obtained information from the crown of an avalanche of a similar depth that had occurred in the same bowl the day prior to this accident, approximately 900’ away from the accident site.

The avalanche failed on a layer of buried surface hoar up to 10 mm in size and approximately 2 to 3’ deep that was originally buried on February 14. This weak layer was widespread throughout the CNFAC forecast regions. In the days and weeks leading up to the accident, the observed human-triggered avalanche activity was most prominent in the Seattle Creek and Lynx Creek drainages within the Turnagain Pass forecast zone. The distribution of the weak layer was most concerning above 1500’ and up to approximately 3500’. In general, the grain size was smaller at higher elevations, and the weak layer distribution was more isolated, likely due to the layer being destroyed by wind prior to being buried.

On March 4, 2025 there was a separate avalanche accident involving three helicopter skiers who were caught and buried and did not survive. This accident occurred in the Twentymile River drainage near Girdwood, AK, roughly 15 miles north of this accident site. It is very likely that the March 4 and March 22 accidents involved the same weak layer of buried surface hoar. Prior to the March 22 accident, there were 21 large (size D2 or bigger) human-triggered avalanches reported on this weak layer in the Seattle Ridge area, including several near misses with partial burials. In some instances, slopes had multiple tracks on them before an avalanche was triggered. On the day prior to the accident there were at least four large human triggered avalanches in the Seattle Ridge area, including one on the northwest aspect of Warm-up Bowl. Based on field assessments from CNFAC staff, stability tests provided inconsistent and unreliable information in regards to the likelihood of triggering this weak layer.

Accident Summary
On the morning of Saturday, March 22, 2025 a group of four headed to Turnagain Pass to ride snowmachines. They were aware of the avalanche center, but at least one had not read the avalanche forecast for that day. They had initially planned on riding in the flats near the parking lot, but ultimately rode up to Seattle Ridge and descended into Main Bowl, west of the ridge. They had three snowmachines with two riders doubling on one of the machines. After riding in Main Bowl, they worked their way south along the ridge and descended into Warm-up Bowl.

There is a terrain feature in the upper part of Warm-up Bowl that can be used as a natural snowmachine jump. The jump feature sits directly below a large slope that a rider has to climb a short way up to turn downhill before hitting the jump. There were multiple tracks on and around this terrain feature before the group started riding. The two riders who were doubling made their way down into the bowl to this feature. The feature itself is a major catchment area, acting as a terrain trap for the overhead avalanche path. Rider 1 wanted to jump, so they dropped off Rider 2 at the base of the slope near the jump feature along with their avalanche airbag pack, then proceeded to hit the jump. Riders 3 and 4 remained at the top of the ridge and were watching from above.

Around 2:30 pm, Rider 1, while near the bottom of the slope above the jump, triggered a large slab avalanche that released approximately 200’ above them. The avalanche caught Rider 1, who struggled to get off to the side of the moving debris. Rider 3 said they almost made it off the slab before the snowmachine turned over, and both the machine and rider were carried into the terrain trap (jump feature). Rider 2 remained near the jump feature during the avalanche, and when the debris came to rest, they were roughly 20 to 100’ away from the looker’s left side of the debris. Riders 3 and 4, after witnessing the avalanche, rode down to the debris and quickly realized both the snowmachine and rider were fully buried.

Rescue Summary
As soon as the riders realized there were no visible clues, Rider 4 got their probe out and began to probe the debris pile. It was understood that Rider 1 did not have an avalanche beacon on, so no beacon search was initiated. Rider 3 quickly spread the word to other groups in the area, asking for assistance, before making their way to the parking lot for help. Rider 3 met a CNFAC staff member in the parking lot, who assisted in notifying emergency services. At the same time, another avalanche center staff member rode to the scene with a good Samaritan to assist with the response and establish a communication line between law enforcement and the accident scene.

Several unaffiliated groups converged at the accident site within 15 to 25 minutes following the avalanche and started probing a broad area of the debris pile. After talking to Rider 2, rescuers got a better idea of the likely burial location and concentrated efforts in that vicinity. Once they relocated, rescuers quickly got a positive probe strike, which occurred roughly 25 to 30 minutes after burial. Seven or eight rescuers worked together to shovel down roughly 12’ to the rider. The CNFAC staff member arrived on scene at approximately 3:15 pm, helped organize shoveling efforts, and began digging with the rescuers already on scene. Rider 1 was found buried, still on their snowmachine, and then excavated from the snow between 3:30 and 3:45 pm. Rider 1 displayed signs incompatible with life at the time they were removed from the debris, and rescuers made the decision not to initiate CPR.

Cloud cover hampered law enforcement recovery efforts on the afternoon of the avalanche. The following morning, Alaska State Troopers, with assistance from Alaska Mountain Rescue Group, were able to recover Rider 1 using a helicopter.

Comments
Avalanche Specialists with the CNFAC obtained details of the accident during the rescue/recovery efforts, a site visit the following day, and through interviews with group members. We are incredibly grateful to Riders 2, 3, and 4 for sharing this difficult experience. We do our best to describe accidents factually and in an effort to help the community better understand them in hopes of preventing future incidents.

All four of the people in this group were minors under the age of 18. No one in the group had formal avalanche training, but Rider 4 had done a significant amount of online self-study. Rider 4 had a beacon, probe, shovel, and avalanche airbag pack. Rider 3 had a beacon, shovel, and avalanche airbag pack but did not have a probe because it had broken days earlier. Rider 2 had no avalanche rescue gear. Rider 1 had an avalanche airbag pack that contained a shovel.

Rider 1 gave their backpack to Rider 2 just before the avalanche. Due to the nature of this avalanche – triggering the avalanche from low down on the slope, leading to a deep burial in a terrain trap – it is unknown if wearing an airbag backpack or avalanche beacon would have changed the tragic outcome of this accident. Despite the unknown in this specific situation, wearing an avalanche beacon and carrying a backpack (with a shovel and probe) is always recommended. Given the lack of an avalanche beacon and depth of burial, the responding unaffiliated riders made an incredible rescue effort in extricating Rider 1 roughly one hour after the avalanche occurred.

Any questions may be directed to:
staff@chugachavalanche.org

Alaska State Trooper Press Release:
https://dailydispatch.dps.alaska.gov/Home/DisplayIncident?incidentNumber=AK25026502

Media:
https://www.adn.com/outdoors-adventure/2025/03/22/snowmachiner-dies-in-avalanche-near-turnagain-pass/